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Contrasts in China and Soviet Reform: Sub-national and National 
Causes  
 
HONGYI  HARRY  LAI 
 
Why did reform in China and the former Soviet Union produce drastically different 
outcomes?  Why did some provinces in China embrace faster economic reform than 
others?  This article argues that the state sector and reform initiatives in the sub-national 
units, reform strategies, entrenchment and maturation of central planning, the size of the 
defence industry, policy choice and the historical context help explain the differences in 
Soviet and Chinese reform courses and outcomes.  A predominant state sector in the 
former Soviet republics had stifled local reform initiatives. Gorbachev resorted to 
democratisation in order to unbolt the gate for popular support for marketisation, yet 
resulting in the breakup of the Soviet Union and destabilising the economy.  In China, 
some provinces had sizable non-state sectors and were inclined to push forth 
marketization.  Reform resulted in expanding non-state sectors, generating high growth 
and encouraging the regime to maintain its monopoly of power.  China’s reform also 
benefited from a yet-to-be-entrenched and rudimentary central planning, a small defence 
sector, popular backlash against past policies, and reformist pragmatic strategy. 
 
Introduction 
Two puzzles have generated heated debates in the studies of reform in China and the 
former Soviet Union.  The first puzzle is a sharp contrast in the approaches and outcomes 
of reform in the two largest communist countries, namely, China and the Soviet Union.  
Since 1978, Chinese leaders have embarked on economic reform without loosening 
political control. China has been experiencing the longest and most rapid industrialisation 
in its modern history.  On the other hand, Soviet leaders moved decisively to open up 
their political system and to decentralise political power.  In the following years, the 
Soviet Union collapsed and economic depression ensued.  The  second  puzzle  relates  to 
the variation in reforms in China’s provinces.  Between 1978 and 1994, during the first 
decade and a half of Chinese reform, some provinces pressed for reform while others did 
so hardly at all.   
 
Two sets of questions thus arise.  First, why did reform in China and the former Soviet 
Union go through such drastically different courses? How did reform paths in the 
countries help generate the contrasting outcomes? Second, why were some provinces in  
China more ready to embrace economic reform than others?  As to be explained, these 
two puzzles can be solved by investigating national and sub-national factors that led to 
divergences of reform in the countries.   
A number of scholars have commented on this China-Soviet contrast in reform.  Two 
contending approaches have caught much attention.   Incrementalists argued that China’s 
gradualist reform successfully overcame economic uncertainties during transition, 
allowed time for institutions to take root, and built political support for reform.
1
  On the 
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other hand, advocates for radical reform counter-argued that economic reform worked 
only when it came in a package and was implemented all at once.  Furthermore, the 
political and economic establishments might only want partial reform so that they could 
continue to collect high rents from resources they controlled.
2
  Democratisation could 
introduce popular support for reform and overcome resistance by these special interests to 
reform.
3
  These scholars blamed the Soviet Union for failing to carry out necessary 
economic reforms. 
Scholars also explained the China-Soviet contrast in terms of their structural or 
institutional differences.  Pei and Huang postulated that China’s state socialism was less 
developed than that in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union.  As a result, the 
former was more flexible and responsive to partial reform.
4
  Sachs and Woo, on the other 
hand, argued that a large state sector in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 
precluded smooth and fruitful gradual reform for heavily subsidised employees of state 
firms refused to move to more dynamic non-state ones.  They postulated that a small state 
sector, a largely rural population, and small heavy industry contributed to the success of 
reform in China.
5
  Aslund argued that communist ideology, party, economy and 
bureaucracy were more entrenched and harder to reform in the Soviet Union than in 
China.
6
  Finally, Solnick argued while decentralisation in the Soviet Union triggered a 
bank run by local agents to seize organisational assets and property rights, the central 
government in China was ready to defend its reputation and prevent any bank run.
7
  
Similarly, Treisman argued that political decentralisation was fruitful in homogeneous 
China but turned out to be disastrous in the divided Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.
8
   
The above discussion has provided us with useful insights into possible causes for 
the China-Soviet contrast.  As suggested, a small state sector, a backward command 
economy, and reform strategies may play a critical role in divergent reforms in ex-
communist countries.  A large state sector would employ more employees.  Thorough 
economic reforms would drive many state-owned enterprises (SOEs) into bankruptcy, 
resulting in many workers losing their jobs, and making a large bureaucracy supervising 
these enterprises irrelevant.  Therefore, both SOE employees and bureaucrats would 
resist reform in order to protect their jobs.   
It still has yet to be shown, however, how the size of the state sector and resistance 
against reform led to differing reform strategies and helped to account for the differing 
reform and contrasting outcomes in the Soviet Union and China.  For example, what role 
did the state sector play in sluggish economic reform and rapid political reform in the 
former Soviet Union in the 1980s?  Did the size of the state sector have anything to do 
with China’s smooth marketisation and sluggish political reform?  Is there any logical 
link between the state sector on the one hand and the disruptive Soviet decentralisation 
and orderly Chinese decentralisation on the other?  Are there other important factors that 
led the two nations down the divergent paths of reform? These questions beg answers. 
I will demonstrate in this article that two sets of factors help to explain the China-
Soviet contrasts in reform.  The first set is the size of the state sector and the inclination 
for reform at the sub-national level as well as reform strategies adopted by top leaders of 
the nation.  The former Soviet republics and the Soviet Union as a whole had a 
predominantly large state sector that would go under at market competition.  The large 
state sector had stifled local initiatives for marketisation.  Frustrated by sluggish 
economic reforms, Gorbachev opened up the political system in order to reduce 
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resistance to reform.  This strategy, however, resulted in independent movements in the 
republics and the breakup of the USSR, destabilising the economy.  In China, some 
provinces had sizable non-state sectors.  When top leaders called for marketisation, these 
provinces were quick to embrace it in order to expand dynamic non-state sectors and 
generate growth.  As successful economic reform can take off without democratisation 
and alleviate popular distrust of the regime, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sees 
fewer imperatives for giving up its monopoly of power.  The different size of the state 
sectors and presence or absence of political decentralisation thus help explain the contrast 
in China and Soviet reform.  Soviet and China’s reform strategies are depicted in 
Diagram 1, where the arrow represents the sequence of reform steps and the plus sign 
stands for simultaneous occurrence. 
 
Diagram 1.  Approaches to Reform at Sub-national Level since the Mid-1980s 
 
USSR: Large state sector Sluggish economic reform  Democratisation (political 
decentralisation)  Breakup of the nation + economic decline 
 
China: Small state sector  Smooth economic reform (economic decentralisation)  Rapid 
economic growth + no political reform + political unity   
 
A second set of factors includes China’s less entrenched and more rudimentary 
central planning, a smaller defence sector, stronger popular backlash against past 
economic policies at the onset of reform, and more pragmatic and incremental reform 
strategy.  Because of these factors, China’s economic reform was less costly, more 
sustainable and productive, and more acceptable to central bureaucrats and especially the 
public.  The remainder of the article will illustrate contrasts in Chinese and Soviet reform, 
evaluate the first set of factors in detail, and then discuss the role of the second set.   
 
Contrast in Chinese and Soviet/Russian Reforms 
Both China and the Soviet Union launched marketisation programmes in the late 1980s 
and the 1990s.  The Soviet Union also embarked on democratisation.  However, the two 
reforms end with starkly contrasting outcomes.  Economically, China’s economy 
experienced phenomenal growth in the past two-and-half decades while the economy of 
the most of the former Soviet republics suffered a collapse in the 1990s.  Some of the 
former republics have just started to recover in the recent years.  Figure 1 illustrates the 
drastic economic contrast in China and Russia, the largest former Soviet republic in the 
1990s.  By 1999 China’s GDP was 2.4 times that in 1990, representing a high growth of 
140%.  In contrast, Russia’s GDP in 1999 was only 54.6% that in 1990, registering a 
steep decline by 45%.   
Politically, the two reforms also ended differently.  In 1991, the Soviet Union broke 
up into 13 independent states, whereas mainland China remained unified.  Therefore, it 
could be said that China’s economic reform is by and large very successful, whereas the 
Soviet approach to marketisation had encountered severe setbacks.   
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Figure 1. China and Russia GDP, 1990-1999
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What is the explanation for the stark contrast in these two reforms? The first set of 
causes is the different size of the state sector and consequential differing reform strategies 
in these countries.  In the former Soviet Union and its republics the state sector took up 
an overwhelming share of total and urban employment prior to perestroika.  The state 
sector accounted for 88% of total labour versus China’s 24%; 96% of urban labour force 
versus China’s 78%; and 79-99% of urban employment in the former Soviet Republics, 
compared to 58-93% in China’s provinces (Table 1).  With marketisation millions of 
employees in a heavily subsidised state sector as well as a large bureaucracy overseeing 
the state would suffer losses in income and even jobs.  Therefore, resistance to economic 
reform was very strong in the former Soviet republics as well as the central bureaucracy.
 
  
Even though Gorbachev had tried to implement perestroika (economic reform) 
during the 1985-87 period, he encountered strong opposition and did not succeed. The 
resistance came from the powerful yet conservative coalition between top leaders and the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party,
9
 bureaucrats at various levels who clumsily 
managed the economy,
10
 as well as workers who were worried about losses in welfare.
11
  
In other words, “a coalition of workers, managers, and bureaucrats in the declining 
sectors succeed in frustrating the needed adjustments”.12  
As a result of the resistance and the long-standing tradition of central planning, the 
actual economic reforms that bureaucrats and official analysts favoured and implemented 
were very timid.  These reforms left intact the fundamentals of the command economy 
and strained central-local relations.
13
  Even after adjustment prices remained distorted, 
sending wrong signals to consumers and producers; enterprises were still subordinated to 
the supervision of bureaucracies.
14
  Central ministries controlled fiscal revenue and major 
industries.  The republics and localities were assigned daunting tasks to finance public 
services with limited resources and were also given limited room to exercise their 
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economic initiatives.  These measures exacerbated central-local fissures and economic 
problems.
15
 
 
 
 
Table 1: State Sector in China and the Former Soviet Union 
Indicators China  
(1978)       
USSR  
(1988) 
China’s 
Provinces  
Former Soviet 
Republic 
     
Share of the state sector in 
total employment (%) 
 
24 88 12- 53 63- 93 
Share of the state sector in 
urban employment (%) 
78 96 58- 93 79- 99 
(estimate) 
 
 
Source: SSB, Quanguo Gesheng, Zizhiqu, Zhixiashi Lishi Tongji Ziliao Huibian; IMF et al, A Study 
of the Soviet Economy, p. 220; and CIA, The World Factbook 1999 (at http://www.odci.gov/ 
cia/publications /factbook/country.html).   
 
 
 
Setbacks in economic reform and frustration at economic conditions prompted 
Gorbachev to change his reform strategy in order to overcome the opposition to reform.  
He emphasised glasnost and demokratizatsiya after 1986.  Through media openness he 
wanted to expose opposition from the nomenklatura to reform and generate popular 
backlash at the nomenklatura.
16
  Through competitive election, Gorbachev aimed to 
remove conservative officials from powerful posts.
17
  He decentralised political power by 
using competitive election to choose deputies at all levels and allowing the legislature to 
oversee the executive.
18
  
The two regression formulae in Table 2 not only support this line of explanation of 
the Soviet reform strategy, but also shed light on the Soviet reform process.  Formula 1 
suggests that the former Soviet republics with a larger state sector in 1988 speeded up 
democratisation, and as a result, had a higher rating of political freedom during the 1993-
94 period.  In the data employed in the analysis, the political freedom of Soviet republics 
was ranked from 1 to 7.  The formula implies that a 50% gap in the share of the state 
sector in total labour force could account for a 6.5 difference in the ranking of freedom, 
i.e., almost the difference between the most unfree and freest of the regimes.  Formula 2 
suggests that the former Soviet republics which speeded up democratisation implemented 
bolder economic reform in the later years.  Formula 2 also implies that a 7-point gap in 
the freedom ranking could account for a 14-point difference in the ranking of economic 
reform, i.e., a virtual difference between the most and the least liberal reforms (the scale 
of economic reform has 15 points).   
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Table 2:  Reforms in Soviet Republics (Standard errors in parentheses) 
 
Formula 1. Regression of political freedom rating (1 to 7) in 1993-94 on the share of the state 
sector in employment in 1988 in former Soviet Republics  
 
         FREEDOM = 15.07 + 12.97 STATESECTOR   
(3.78) (4.58)  
       (Adjusted R square: 0.41, significance of F: 0.02)       
     
 
Formula 2. Regression of economic reform (1 to 15) in 1996 on political freedom rating in 
1993-94 in former Soviet Republics  
 
          ECONREFORM = 16.23 + 2.05 FREEDOM 
(2.40) (0.51)  
        (Adjusted R square: 0.60, significance of F: 0.003) 
 
Notes: The formulae use data from the following 11 former Soviet republics-- Azerbaijan, 
Byelorussian, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and 
Uzbekistan. The data on political repression comes from Freedom-House rating of political repression.  The 
original rating from 1 to 7 is transformed from 7 to 1.  For example, a repression rating of 1 is transformed 
into freedom rating of 7. 
 
Source: Refer to Table 1; Freedom House, Freedom in the World: The Annual Survey of Political 
Rights and Civil Liberties, 1993-94 (New York: Freedom House, 1994); Freedom House, World Survey of 
Economic Freedom, 1995-96: A Freedom House Study (New York: Freedom House, 1996). 
 
Political reform thus changed the dynamics of economic reform in the Soviet 
republics. As the former Soviet republics became democratic, the public could vote on 
two options of reform.  The first choice was partial economic reform, which would only 
create prolonged suffering for the populace and could benefit only groups with political 
connections.  The other choice was fast and comprehensive reform.  The public opted for 
faster economic reform.  Empirical analyses also confirm this argument that Eastern 
European countries and former Soviet republics that had speeded up political 
liberalisation had experienced faster economic reform.
19
 
Political reform, however, eroded central political control over localities in the 
Soviet Union.  Russians accounted for merely 51% of the population in the Soviet Union 
in 1991 (Table 3), and a minority of the population in many republics.  Gorbachev also 
failed to incorporate regional representatives in the centre.
20
  The Soviet sub-national 
elites were structured largely along ethnic line.  In the wake of democratisation and 
political decentralisation, ethnic cadres turned into political entrepreneurs, advanced 
ethnofederalism and claimed independence from the centre.  Gorbachev’s reluctance to 
suppress also reinforced the determination of separatists.
21
  In December 1991, the 
presidents of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine dealt a fatal blow to the Soviet Union by 
signing the Belovezhskaya Pushcha agreement that established the Commonwealth of 
Independent States.  
Gorbachev’s reform strategy proved to be disastrous.  Regional separatism generated 
economic instability.  Hasty changes in policies and lack of central supervision bred poor 
reform management and encouraged plundering of public assets, corruption and poor 
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decisions, resulting in economic disorder.
22
  The collapse of the Soviet Union led to a 
severe disruption in trade, a drastic fall in outputs, and a rise in external debts.
23
  
In contrast, the state sector was much smaller in China, permitting a smooth start of 
reform in some provinces.  In addition, economic, rather than political power has been 
decentralised in China, no democratisation has occurred, and the Han is the majority of 
the population in most provinces.  National unity and stability is thus maintained.   
China benefited from a Han overwhelming majority (92.2%) in the population and 
most of its provinces (Table 3).  Only in two provinces, i.e., Tibet and Xinjiang, the Han 
accounted for less than 50% of the population.  Although separatist movements in the 
two provinces pose challenges for the state, both provinces are subject to the tight and 
centralised control of the state.
24
  
Furthermore, as Huang had suggested, the central government in China has retained 
considerable political power.
25
  Through the control of provincial-level nonmenklatura 
the central Party continues to appoint provincial leaders and supervise and encourage 
their reform efforts.  Calls for democratisation in the Tiananmen Movement in 1989 in 
the wake of economic stresses were suppressed by force.  Nevertheless, in 1992, China  
 
 
Table 3: Ethnicities, Freedom, and Reform in China and the Former Soviet Union 
Indicators China  
(1978)       
USSR  
(1988) 
   
Share of the largest ethnic 
group in the population (%) 
 
92.2 
(1982) 
51 
(1991) 
Political freedom rating of the 
1990- 1991 period (1 to 7) 
 
1 3.5 
Reforms and outcomes No political opening; 
successful economic reform 
and economic 
decentralisation  
Political opening and 
decentralisation; ineffective 
economic reforms; breakup of the 
USSR; instability and conflict 
 
 Source: Refer to Table 1. The data on political repression comes from Freedom-House rating of 
political repression.  The original rating from 1 to 7 is transformed from 7 to 1.  For example, a repression 
rating of 1 is transformed into freedom rating of 7. 
 
 
 
renewed economic liberalisation.  With high growth and political stability the regime has 
been able to justify and sustain its reform course. 
China’s above reform path can work also largely because China’s provinces had a 
much smaller state sector than the Soviet republics at the beginning of the reform (Table 
1), facilitating economic liberalisation.  In 1978, when China’s economic reforms started, 
the state sector employed only 24% of total labour force in most of the Chinese 
provinces, and 58-77% of the urban labour force in eight eastern provinces.
26
  In contrast, 
the non-state sectors accounted for 76% of the nation’s labour force (including rural 
labour) and 23%-42% of urban labour in eight coastal provinces.  Thus, the state sector 
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was a small provider of employment nationwide in China than in the Soviet Union.  In 
several provinces, with steady expansion a few years after the reform, non-state sectors 
could grow to half of the industrial output and surpass the state sector.  With firm support 
from national reformists such as Deng Xiaoping, under pressure from a considerable non-
state industrial sector, and eager to reap economic benefits of the larger and dynamic 
non-state sectors, a number of provinces would thus view reform favorably.  Reform 
initiatives would have a greater chance to succeed in China’s provinces.   
However, an empirical question arises: Did China’s provinces with a smaller state 
sector speed up marketisation?  This question is highly relevant given the fact that the 
Soviet republics with a large state sector had to undergo democratisation before 
embarking on liberal economic reform.  If the answer is affirmative, we can conclude for 
sure that the size of the state sector is indeed the key to explaining smoother 
marketisation in China’s provinces than in the Soviet republics and can help explain the 
contrasting reform courses in the Soviet Union and China.  The above explanation of the 
China-Soviet contrast will then be confirmed.  
 
Provincial Promotion of Non-state Economy in China 
In order to assess the relationship between the size of the state sector and the pace of 
reform in China, the rate of economic reform in China’s provinces must be evaluated.  
However, as ratings of economic reform in China’s provinces are non-existent, I have 
decided, for reasons to be explained, to focus on  provincial promotion of the non-state 
economy as an important aspect of local marketisation as well as a good measure of 
provincial reform.   
Non-state sectors composed of collective firms (owned by local communal or 
political groups and dominated by rural enterprises), foreign-owned or joint ventures, 
private business, and mixed sectors.  These non-state sectors are subject to more effective 
oversight by their owners and are thus more cost-effective than state firms; they have to 
survive increasingly tense market competition while enjoying little governmental 
protection; and they are more dynamic than state firms.
27
  This point is illustrated in 
Table 4.   
Much of the phenomenal growth in China during the reform comes from non-state 
sectors.  As Figure 2 shows, China’s industrial output grew by over fivefold during the 
1978-1997 period, from under 500 billion yuan to nearly 3,000 billion yuan (at 1978 
price).  Over half of the growth came from the rapidly expanding non-state sectors.   The 
promotion of the non-state economy is thus a crucial reform measure in China.   
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Table 4. Forms of Ownership in China in the Reform Era 
 
Ownership Owners 
Level of Exposure 
to Markets 
   
STATE 
National, provincial, and municipal 
governments Low 
   
NON-STATE   
Collective 
Townships, villages, local organisations and 
groups, and urban neighborhood committees Moderate 
   
Private Individuals High 
   
Foreign 
International investors or along with Chinese 
collaborators High 
 
 
Figure 2.  China's Industrial Output by Ownership, 1978-1997
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In the reform era, the central government and national reformists head by Deng 
devolved economic power to the localities partly to gain local support for its national 
reform.
28
  Deng also promoted provincial leaders who excelled at engineering local 
reform and growth.  With a strong support from national reformists such as Deng 
Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang, and Hu Yaobang and in the wake of decentralisation, provinces 
earned considerable leeway in charting their own reform course.  Liberal-oriented 
provinces utilised their expanded economic freedom, eagerly pursued reform and actively 
promoted the non-state economy.  In contrast, conservative provinces adopted sluggish 
reform, tried hard to protect SOEs, and restricted non-state firms.  The extent of the 
growth of the non-state economy thus serves as an important and primary measure of 
provincial reform efforts.  In this article, the change in the share of the non-state economy 
in provincial industrial output (CHGNSI) is used as an indicator of provincial reform 
efforts.   
The above analysis on reform in the Soviet republics uses the share of the state sector 
in labour force as an indicator of the size of the state sector.  The share of the non-state 
sectors in non-agricultural labour force (NSSLF) is used as an indicator of the size of 
non-state sectors in China’s provinces.29  It has also been suggested that much larger non-
state sectors would encourage faster reform in China’s provinces.  In order to investigate 
this hypothesis, I regress CHGNSI during the 1980-88 period on the NSSLF in 1980 in 
27 provinces (excluding Tibet, Hainan and Gansu due to lack of data).  The results are 
summarized in the following formula (t score in parentheses). 
 
 
CHGNSI80-88 = .058     +   .516 NSSLF80;  adjusted R square = 0.204,  F score = 7.67. 
(2.0) (2.77) 
 
Using an expanded data set, I ran a similar analysis.  I regressed the change in the 
share of non-state sectors in provincial industrial output during the 1978-93 period on the 
share of non-state sectors in non-agricultural labour force in 1980.  The results, described 
as follows, are also similar. 
CHGNSI78-93 = .115     +   .942 NSSLF80;    adjusted R square = 0.21,   F score = 7.99. 
(2.19) (2.83) 
 
The two formulae are statistically significant.  They suggest that provinces with 
larger non-state sectors at the beginning of reform would promote the non-state economy 
more swiftly and more actively in the subsequent decade.  Therefore, the results support 
the above hypothesis that China’s reform has been smoother than the Soviet one because 
China’s provinces had larger non-state sectors (i.e., a smaller state sector).  Due to 
resistance to reform from a larger state sector, Soviet leaders conducted political reform 
in order to generate greater support for more thorough economic reform.  In China, a 
smaller state sector meant weaker resistance to reform, allowing economic reform to start 
in a number of provinces and then spread to other provinces.  The Chinese state felt little 
need to undergo democratisation for the sake of furthering marketisation. 
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Provincial Incentives to Promote Economic Growth 
The next question is why a larger non-state economy at the beginning of reforms could 
induce reform in China’s provinces in the subsequent years.  Several reasons stand out.  
First of all, in the reform era local economic growth had become vital sources for local 
governments to generate local revenue and finance local public goods. Through economic 
decentralisation the center also passed to local governments numerous tasks including 
schooling children, providing unemployment benefits and health care for employees of 
SOEs and governmental institutions, and building local roads.  But the central 
government provided them very limited money.
30
  In order to finance these unfunded 
mandates, local governments try to expand the local economy and generate revenue.  The 
local economy affects even local governmental revenue and local cadres’ material 
benefits.
31
  Non-state sectors, as stated, serve as an important engine for economic boom.   
Second, in the wake of economic decentralisation local governments have large 
claims to fiscal surplus, especially that from rural enterprises.  This further motivates 
local governments to promote these enterprises.  As Oi and Whiting suggest, the right to 
local fiscal revenue can be regarded a form of special property rights.
32
  In the wake of 
economic decentralisation, localities could claim a large portion of fiscal surplus.  These 
claims also stimulate local interests in promoting the non-state economy. 
Third, many local enterprises, especially collective enterprises have close ties with 
local governments.  Local governments have fiscal and political stakes in the health of 
these enterprises.  They might even collude with enterprises to evade central taxes.
33
 
Foreign and private business people also cultivate ties with local officials and try to earn 
favourable treatment for business expansion.  
Fourth, the primary criterion for cadres’ performance has also shifted from 
ideological confirmation to economic growth.  Local wealth has become a stepping stone 
for official promotion and is a main source of official prestige.
34
 
Fifth, incentives to promote the non-state economy, however, are weaker in 
provinces with a larger state sector. Liberal policies were new to provinces and would 
entail risks.  The entry of non-state enterprises could threaten the monopoly of SOEs, cut 
into the profits and taxes of SOEs, and even result in unemployment of SOEs.  In 
provinces where SOEs were numerous and non-state enterprises were small, it would 
take a longer time for non-state enterprises to become a sizable player and significant 
fiscal contributor.  In the short run, the negative impact of the liberalised entry of non-
state enterprises would be more apparent.  In these provinces leaders and officials might 
be more reluctant to introduce reforms out of concern with poorer performance of the 
pillar sector (i.e. SOEs), economic disruption, and fiscal shortfalls.  They might also 
worry about protests from workers who were laid off by SOEs under reform. 
Finally, shorter tenure for jobs also accentuated worries of leaders of provinces with 
a large state sector about the short-term negative effects from expanding non-state 
sectors.  The tenure for Party secretaries since 1979 averaged 3.44 years and that for 
governors 2.85 years.
35
  Meanwhile, within a 15-year span between 1978 and 1993 the 
share of non-state sectors in national industrial output rose by 31% (from 22% to 53%).  
During a provincial leader’s short tenure of three years, reformist policies might generate 
an average 6.2% gain for non-state sectors in the output.   For provinces already with 
sizable non-state sectors, the gain might be larger than 6.2%.  For example, the share of 
non-state sectors in Zhejiang’s industrial output registered a high 39% in 1978.  From 
 12 
1978 to 1993 this share increased by 8% during every three years.  The rapid gain thus 
helped these sectors to fast become the dominant player for the local economy.  For the 
Northeastern Jilin Province that started with a small non-state sector which accounted for 
21% of industrial output in 1978, the share increased by merely 2.8% during every three  
years.  Leaders of provinces with a larger state sector might adopt a risk-averse strategy 
of introducing cautious reforms.  Therefore, provincial reform efforts would vary, 
depending on the size of non-state sectors at the onset of reform.
36
 
 
Advantages of Expanding Non-state Sectors in China 
The varying size of the state sector in China and the Soviet Union also shaped their 
subsequent strategies for marketisation.  In the former Soviet republics, prior to 1990, the 
bureaucracy opposed any substantial reform of the central planning and SOEs and 
thwarted economic liberalisation.  In the 1990s many former Soviet republics, especially 
Russia pushed for privatisation of SOEs through corporatisation, vouchers to citizens and 
even through sales of stocks to workers, managers, local governments and outside 
buyers.
37
 Privatisation, unfortunately, resulted in severe unemployment and a steep 
decline in consumption demands, hurting economic growth.  It also degraded into asset 
stripping by managers and officials, or sales to workers of the enterprises under reform, 
and discrimination of common citizens (outsiders).  However, the entry barrier for new 
non-state firms did not ease significantly under Gorbachev and probably even for years 
after the breakup of the Soviet Union.
38
  As a result, the economy is dominated by 
oligopolies of large former state enterprises, while dynamic non-state enterprises are 
deprived of their due roles.   
In contrast, China’s approach is liberalisation without privatisation. The state 
gradually relaxed entry of firms to the market while trying to improve the performance of 
SOEs and avoid mass sell-off of their assets.  As stated, non-state firms have gradually 
grown into a dominant component of the economy and have become a main engine of 
China’s growth.  Meanwhile, some state enterprises have improved their performance 
after restructuring, while others are struggling.  The state sector serves as a secondary 
engine for growth.  Unemployment has risen, and yet it has not exploded.  China has not 
experienced the same fall in consumption as did the former Soviet republics.  China’s 
gradual, pluralistic, and prudent approach to ownership reform helps sustain growth.  All 
in all, the size of the state sector might help us to better account for the varying approach 
and outcomes in reform in these two large communist countries. 
Booming non-state sectors have brought two significant benefits to China’s 
provincial economy.  The first benefit is that non-state sectors drove economic growth in 
provinces that were actively promoting these sectors.  In provinces that endorsed these 
sectors and witnessed their rapid expansion, industrial output was growing also at a 
breakneck pace.  In Zhejiang, for example, the share of non-state sectors in industrial 
output increased by 30% from 1978 to 1988, far above the national average of 20.8%.  As 
a result, Zhejiang’s annual industrial growth during the 1978-89 period registered 12.5%, 
far higher than the national average of 9%.  The correlation coefficient between the  
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change in the share of non-state sectors in industrial output during the 1978-88 period of 
twenty eight provinces whose data are available and the annual industrial growth during 
the 1978-89 period is 0.644.  Well exceeding the benchmark of 0.5, this suggests that the 
two factors are highly correlated.  In other words, the faster the boom of non-state 
sectors, the higher the growth these provinces would experience. 
The second benefit of soaring non-state sectors is employment.  Non-state sectors 
could provide jobs for rural surplus labor and urban job seekers, especially young 
laborers.  Over the long run, non-state sectors have played a positive role in job creation, 
despite possible negative effects of competition against SOEs causing laid-offs in these 
enterprises.  An analysis of regressing the average urban unemployment of the 1978-88 
period (UNEMPL78-88) on change in the share of non-state sectors in industrial output of 
78-88 (CHGNSI78-88) yields a statistical significance formula as follows:  UNEMPL78-88 = 
0.042 -0.053 CHGNSI78-88, adjusted R square = 0.10, F statistics of equation = 3.86.  
Thus in the long run booming non-state sectors help to create jobs and ease urban 
unemployment, which in turn stimulates consumers’ confidence, consumption and further 
economic growth.  These two benefits can help to account for the stark contrast in the 
outcomes of reforms in the Soviet Union and China. 
 
Entrenchment and Maturation of the Command Economy 
In addition to the size of the state sector and reform initiatives at the sub-national level 
and national reform strategies, a second set of factors also contributed to the contrasts in 
China and Soviet reforms.  Among them, a preeminent factor is that the planned economy 
was more entrenched and more developed in the Soviet Union than China.  Specifically, 
the Chinese command economy was more rudimentary and operated more inefficiently 
than the Soviet counterpart.
39
  Thus it was easier and less costly for the Chinese to 
undertake reform. 
These two factors may also explain the varying pace of economic reform in Asian 
and European ex-communist economies.  The earlier the planned economy was set up, 
the more entrenched, developed and elaborate it would become, the greater the number of 
bureaucrats, managers, and employees who had a substantial stake in the system, and the 
greater the costs any overhaul of the system would incur.  Central planning as an 
institution also follows the path of dependency.  The longer it has existed, the greater 
inertia it would create to sustain itself.   
In order to verify the role of institutional entrenchment in economic reform, I 
regress a measure of economic reform on the number of years under the command 
economy (YComEcn) in Asian and European ex-communist economies.  These countries 
are China, Mongolia, Vietnam, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Albania, Croatia, Macedonia, 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, Russia, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzekistan.  The measure is composed by the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), measuring the extent of 
economic reform.  The aggregate transition indicator in 1999 (AgLibInx99) is the sum of 
scores on major economic reforms, including privatisation and restructuring, market 
liberalisation and competition, and financial markets reform.  The higher the sore, the 
faster the reform a country had carried out.
40
  The regression result is as follows, with T-
scores in parentheses. 
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AgLibInx99 = 2.08 - 1.05 YComEcon; adjusted R square = 0.608,   F score = 42.92. 
           (6.55) (-1.20) 
 
The regression result suggests that the longer a country was under central planning 
the lower the index of its economic reform it would have, or the more conservative its 
reform would become.  Thus, an entrenched command economy does indeed hinder 
reform.  The Soviet people, as in the case of Russia, had lived under the command 
economy for 74 years when the economic reform started, and the Chinese did so for 29 
years when Deng launched economic reform.  The command economy was far more 
entrenched in the Soviet Union than in China and was more difficult to reform. 
It has been argued that the Chinese economic planning was more rudimentary than 
the Soviet counterpart and was more susceptible to reform.  This is indeed the case.  Prior 
to reform the Soviet Central Statistical Administration (CSA) was more competent and 
effective than the State Statistical Bureau (SSB) in China.  In 1959 the CSA already used 
national input-output tables with a 73-by-73 matrix.  Only until 1982 did the SSB 
develop an 88-by-88 input-output table, yet it covered only one province. With a greater 
competency the Soviet central government allocated 48,426 products in 1973, but the 
Chinese counterpart only 617.  A more rudimentary central planning makes reform of it 
easier, less costly, and more attractive for China; a more developed and mature central 
planning rendered its reformation more costly and less attractive in the USSR.
 41
 
In addition, as a result of a more entrenched and developed central planning, the 
central bureaucracy was larger in the Soviet Union than in China.  In 1990, the 
employees of the central government in China including the Party totaled 340,000, or 
0.06% of the nation’s labour force. 42   On the other hand, employees in the central 
government in the Soviet republics excluding those in the Ministries of Defence and 
Internal Affairs, the Central Party, and the Youth League accounted for 1.5% to 1.8% of 
the labour force in 1989.
43
  Thus an overhaul and weakening of central planning would  
jeopardise jobs of a much larger group of central governmental employees in the Soviet 
Union; these officials would have strongly opposed reform.  In order to undermine the 
central opposition to his economic reform, Gorbachev resorted to democratisation and 
political decentralisation.  
 
Other Causes for Sino-Soviet Contrasts 
Another reason for greater difficulties for economic reform in the USSR than in China is 
that defense played a greater role in the economy and the state’s revenue spending in the 
USSR.  The Soviet Union spent a much greater sum than China on defence in order to 
match the U.S. military might, defend its extremely long border, and keep its Eastern 
Europe satellite countries under control.  The U.S. government estimated that the USSR 
devoted 15 to 17 % of its annual gross national product (GNP) to military spending since 
the mid-1980s and that until the early 1980s, Soviet defence expenditures rose between 4 
and 7 % a year.  In 1988 when the military expenditure reached its peak it totalled 
US$319 billion.
44
   
In contrast, China’s defence spending was much smaller than that in the Soviet 
Union.  Unlike the Soviets, the Chinese did not aim to match the U.S. military; it had a 
relatively shorter border to defend and had no major troop deployment in a satellite 
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country.  In the 1980s Deng even downsized the troops and cut the military budget in 
order to finance economic development.  The U.S. Central Intelligence Agency estimated 
that the Chinese defence expenditures in 1978 absorbed 8 to 10 % of GNP and that it fell 
within the range of 6 to 8 % of GNP in 1986.  In 1989 Chinese military spending totalled 
US$43 billion, about one seventh of the Soviet expenses.
45
  China’s military spending, 
measured in its share of the GNP, was about half of the size of the Soviet expenses.   
A smaller defence industry benefited China’s reform in two aspects.  First, China 
could devote more resources for economic reform and ensure its success.  Second, China 
did not have to reform a large defence industry that tended to be dominated by the state; 
China’s economic reform was thus easier to implement. 
In addition, a few factors also contribute to the China-Soviet contrasts in reform.  
First, Gorbachev’s reform programmes, especially in the late 1980s, were impractical and 
even reckless.  Even the Ryzhkov’s gradual reform in July 1990 started with tripling of 
bread price, resulting in a veto by the USSR Supreme Soviet.  Then this programme was 
replaced by the widely-noted “500 days” plan of Shatalin, which had an ambitious goal 
of abolishing central planning and building a market economy within 500 days.   Yet it 
lacked specific and practical measures to address grave economic issues in reform.  At 
the political front, as stated, Gorbachev erred disastrously in granting too much political 
power to republics and enabling them to break away from Moscow.
46
  The breakup of the 
union also dealt a devastating blow to the Soviet economy.  One may attribute the radical  
and impractical reform in the Soviet Union to the Russian impatient and rash 
temperament and political idealism and the gradual and practical Chinese reform to the 
pragmatist Chinese political tradition upheld by Deng.  
Another major factor is that historical junction at which the two nations started their 
reform.  When China started its reform in the late 1970s, the party-state was in a deep 
legitimacy crisis and Mao’s policies were widely discredited.  After the tumultuous and 
traumatic Cultural Revolution, the Chinese sought an immediate improvement in their 
impoverished life.  They were ready to accept a significant reversal of Mao’s economic 
policies.
47
  In contrast, the Soviet people had enjoyed a stable, decent albeit stagnant 
material life prior to reform.  They feared about losses of their jobs, subsidies, and 
welfare in the course of reform.  Therefore, it was easier to introduce economic reform in 
China than in the Soviet Union.   
 
Conclusion 
The contrast in the China-Soviet economic reform can thus in part be understood in terms 
of two sets of factors.  The first is the size of the state sector in these two countries and 
subsequent reform strategies.  Sizable non-state sectors and a relatively small state sector 
helped stimulate efforts in promoting marketisation in a number of China’s provinces.  
With the support from paramount central reformist Deng Xiaoping, these liberal 
provinces gained an edge in reform and economic development, and their leaders 
obtained a ladder for fast political promotion.  Other provinces were pressured to follow 
suit or risk losing out in an economic race in the long run.  Thus competitive 
liberalization was generated.
48
  Chinese economic reform could proceed smoothly and 
spread across provinces without political liberalism. By avoiding political 
decentralisation, the central Party in China has maintained its administrative control of 
local officials and prevented them from rampantly plundering state assets.
49
  The success 
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of economic reform earned the Chinese communist regime considerable political 
legitimacy and encouraged it to maintain its grip on power.   
In contrast, the state sector was overwhelmingly large across the Soviet republics.  
Local reform initiatives were scant, whereas resistance to reform was strong.  Gorbachev 
liberalised the political regime, generated popular support, and facilitated economic 
reform across the republics.  This strategy proved to be disastrous.  However, as many 
republics have a large majority of non-Russian population, ethnic separatism emerged in 
the wake of political decentralisation.  As the Soviet Union disintegrated, the central  
government lost its ability to enforce effective and orderly economic reform and control 
official corruption, and economic catastrophes took place.  Thus Sachs and Woo have 
rightly pointed to the varying size of the state sector as one of the causes of the China-
Soviet contrast.
50
  
A second set of causes also helps produce the divergence in China and Soviet 
reforms.  The central planning was established earlier, in a more refined form, and more  
entrenched in the Soviet Union than in China.  The defence industry and military 
spending were much larger in the Soviet Union than in China.  In the late 1980s the 
Soviet leaders pursued a more radical, yet poorly-conceived reform package, resulting in 
setbacks of the reform.  Finally, the Soviet people were more contented with economic 
policies than the Chinese prior to the reform.  In contrast, the Chinese, who had suffered 
from the Cultural Revolution, desired a change in Mao’s policies and a quick 
improvement in their living standard.   The Chinese leaders emphasized pragmatism and 
incrementalism, avoiding major setbacks in reform.  These factors combined to produce 
an easy start, smooth progress, and a quick success of economic reform in China; they 
rendered the launch of the Soviet marketisation more difficult, its progress more 
hazardous, and its success less likely.  
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